advantages of a universal monarchy, acting as a judge above the sovereign states, who in turn are balanced against each other in the institutionalised federative system. On this basis, Penn believed, trust among states would be possible. This would in turn advance the 'Peace and Prosperity of Europe'. 201 Pious words, but Penn apparently did not doubt that there was a realistic chance for trust and ultimately for peace on the basis of his proposal.
The Abbé De Saint-Pierre's (1658-1743) Project for Peace and his Challenge to Early Modern Statecraft
In contrast to the previous wars waged by Louis XIV, the War of the Spanish Succession 202 was not started by him. It ensued because of conflicts endogenous to the European state system. The European powers had long anticipated this conflict over the Spanish inheritance since they all had vested interests in how to divide the enormous territories of the Spanish monarchy. France and the Austrian Habsburgs seemed to have equally valid dynastic claims to succeed to the Spanish throne. The Protestant maritime powers -England and the Dutch Republic -could not allow the huge Spanish overseas dominion to fall solely to the French. But all plans, secret agreements of partition and attempts to sort out these conflicting European interests on the basis of dynastic politics failed. Not long before his death, Charles II had declared in his will that Philippe of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV, should become heir to the Spanish crown. 203 In the winter of 1700 French diplomacy was prepared to take the risk of driving the sea powers into the arms of the Austrian Habsburgs. When Charles II died on 1 November 1700, Louis XIV declared on the sixteenth of the same month in the name of his grandson that France was willing to accept Charles II's testament. 204 He knew that this move would provoke the other European powers and he consequently prepared to secure the execution of Charles II's will by force. The Bavarian prince elector Max Emanuel and the prince elector of Cologne were the only allies on the French side.
France thus faced a formidable coalition of European forces, formed as the great alliance of The Hague in September 1701 and led by William III and Leopold I. 205 With Prince Eugen and John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, the military campaign of this coalition was led by two remarkable generals. When William III died on 8 March 1702, Louis XIV recognised the son of the former King James II who had died in 1701 in French exile, as James III King of England. This was perceived as an additional threat to England, especially as it threatened to re-catholicise the English crown, and it helped to further cement the coalition between the Austrian Habsburgs and England.
As we have already seen with Penn's plan for a European peace from 1693 and Fletcher's Discours concerning the Affairs of Spain from 1698, French aggression and the pending question of the Spanish succession attracted the attention of European political thinkers. The Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743) and a minor text with an apparently similar proposal by John Bellers (1654-1725), entitled Some Reasons for an European State, proposed to the Powers of Europe, were written towards the end of the war of the Spanish succession and can be seen as closely related to the concerns already raised by Penn and Fletcher. Like Penn, they followed in the tradition of earlier works 206 and both explicitly reference Henry IV's Grand Design.
Like his friend Penn, Bellers was a Quaker.
208 Unlike Penn's and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's writings, though, his short pamphlet does not engage with a systematic evaluation of the inherent problems of a federative constitution for Europe. He claims that the English union with Scotland shows that Europe could achieve the same and that Queen Anne should 'use Her endeavours for Uniting the Powers of Europe in one peaceable Settlement'. 209 Although he advocated that an 'original contract'
210 between the European states should be signed in order to establish a federal jurisdiction and arbitration, his argument seems initially to lack the conviction and persuasive force of both Penn and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. Bellers tried to influence the formulation of the war aims of the allied powers ranged against France. His appeal to interest and utility is mixed with ethical and moral claims but, similarly to Penn and later Saint-Pierre, his proposal was 'that at the next General Peace, there should be settled an Universal Guarantee, 
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Bellers had been prosecuted and imprisoned several times before the English Parliament passed the Toleration Act in 1689. And he had seen the persecutions in France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. As a matter of fact, he had helped Huguenots to flee France and settle in the New World, in Pennsylvania.
216 There can, therefore, be no doubt that Bellers and Penn worked very closely together on their projects. They were both motivated by religious convictions. At the heart of Bellers' proposal for European peace lies a deep concern for religious toleration and a quest to find common ground among the different Christian confessions. Only in this way would it be possible 'to put an end to all Wars and Bloodshed for Religion'.
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Bellers' short work may only have had limited influence on the political debates about the reorganisation of the European state system, but his concern for a religious settlement signals an element missing in the Abbé's plan for peace. 218 However, 'Bellers quickly became a forgotten figure, and when he was re-discovered almost a century after his death, it was not his peace plan but his schemes for economic reform which excited interest'.
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In fact the Abbé's own plan for peace 220 was for a long time considered an eccentric and utterly unrealistic idea. Voltaire's acid criticism exemplifies this negative view. Under the telling pseudonym of Dr Goodheart, Voltaire published his De la Paix perpétuelle in 1769. The second half of the first sentence of this work was targeted at the Abbé: 'The peace imagined by a Frenchman named Abbé de Saint-Pierre is a chimera which will never survive between princes any more than between elephants and rhinoceroses, between wolves and dogs. Carnivorous animals always tear each other apart at the first opportunity'.
221 Accordingly, Kant remarked that the peace project of the 'Abbé St. Pierre ( . . . ) has always been ridiculed by great statesmen, and still more by heads of state, as an academic and childish idea emerging from the schools'.
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This situation has not much improved in recent scholarship. Notwithstanding some important studies 223 , the significance of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre as a political thinker has long been ignored. In many ways this has to do with what appears to be no more than a minor biographical detail that stubbornly remains misleading in wide parts of the relevant literature. Even in fairly recent studies on the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, or in general accounts of the history of international relations, we find the myth Additional circumstantial evidence points to the same conclusion. The letters of accreditation and passports for the envoys to the congress do not show the name of Saint-Pierre, nor does the Abbé himself talk in his Annales politiques as though he had been at the congress in Utrecht.
227 The assertion -made without any endeavour to provide the slightest proofthat the Abbé 'was present at the Congress of Utrecht, which gave him the idea of writing the Project' is simply not substantiated. The Abbé de Saint-Pierre had started on his project well before 1712. We know of at least four shorter prior versions written between 1708 and 1711. 229 However, this does not mean that he was not keen to present the final version to exert influence on the preliminary peace negotiations and the outcome of the settlement: 'It does not seem complicated to me to improve this project', he wrote '( . . . ) but several people who know about public affairs and who have carefully read the book assured me that as it is, if it were printed in several languages and spread in the most important cities of Europe, it could give useful insights to the principal ministers and to those who will be involved in future peace negotiations and thus make the peace easier to achieve and more lasting'.
230 The Abbé made a similar claim in the preface to his Projet: 'It is easy to understand that the more this project contains methods to make peace unalterable in Europe, the more it will be able to help facilitate the conclusion of the one we are currently treating at Utrecht'.
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The Abbé de Saint-Pierre's principal writings are still unavailable in English, and he is largely neglected in anglophone research on international political thought. 234 If Rousseau does not provide an adequate understanding of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's proposal for perpetual peace, the explanation lies in the fact that for Rousseau, but not for the Abbé, the Holy Roman Empire was crucial to guaranteeing the balance of power in Europe.
Arguably the Abbé was sidelined because he challenged what appeared to almost all contemporary diplomats and statesmen to be the most important concept in the realm of international politics, that is to say, the balance of power among European sovereigns and states. After the Peace of Westphalia, the idea of a balance of power emerged as the highest wisdom of European statecraft to safeguard interstate relations and the status quo. seeing it instead as the obstacle to a durable peace structure. 236 He was well aware that the doctrine of sovereignty was at the heart of the raison d'être of the balance of power. But he had to confront this conception if he was to provide an alternative. The constitution of the Holy Roman Empire provided him with a historical example; moreover, it served as a means of accommodating sovereignty in a wider framework, which in turn would allow for reliable peace and stability.
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Facing the dilemma that the sovereigns of the European states jealously guarded their prerogatives 238 , the Abbé de Saint-Pierre reformulated the problems already spelled out by Machiavelli and Hobbes in his attempt to provide new answers. As argued in Chapter 3.3, Pufendorf addressed this dilemma in a systematic analysis. His equation of the state of nature with the relationship between states tackled the most troublesome aspect of interstate relations, namely, how international law can be enforceable and at the same time compatible with the sovereignty of each state. The idea of a system of states allowed for a new conceptualisation of this intractable problem. However, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre was equally critical of Grotius and Pufendorf, whose solutions rested in his view on theories of natural law. Instead -and that is, prima facie, more than surprising -he praised Hobbes as the most pertinent source of guidance: 'Hobbes ( . . . ) has approached this more by using the good method of demonstration, but, unable to address all principles, instead of real 236 As we have seen in the previous chapters, the Abbé was not the first to explicitly develop a project for peace in Europe nor was he the first to elaborate a theory of international relations. For a general overview on other peace projects during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see also 
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Although in his Projet he does not mention Hobbes's name, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre drew on his theory of sovereignty to apply Hobbes's political philosophy to the sphere of interstate relations. As long as a sovereign arbiter over the various nations is not implemented, the remedy provided by natural law necessarily remains deficient. Hobbes maintained that sovereignty was not applicable to relations between states. For Hobbes, one is therefore 'not to expect such a peace between two nations; because there is no common power in this world to punish their injustice'.
240 The Abbé de Saint-Pierre applied the Hobbesian solution to overcome the consequences of the state of nature to the international sphere, namely to establish an arbiter above the anarchical society of states.
At the historical watershed, where the concrete development and philosophical justification of state authority were emerging in response to the breakdown of universal Christendom, the Abbé perceived the anarchical society of states as the obstacle to a lasting peace. That relations between states were similar to the situation of individuals or families in the state of nature was a commonplace in political theory and practice. Given that sovereigns of states claimed themselves to be judge in their own case, all treaties and contracts remained precarious, there being no redress if any of the contractual parties decided not to honour the contractual obligations. 'Sovereigns may give their word, may bind themselves by mutual promises, sign contracts between themselves; but there is not the least security that one or the other of the contracting parties will not change his mind'. 241 The lack of mutual trust re-emerges as a central problem in interstate relations.
242 Promises and treaties are only binding The importance of trust was analysed and employed equally by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre in his other reform projects. In particular as part of his plans for financial reform he put forward the argument that the crown would be ill-advised to continue using their brutal and deceitful measures. Instead, a transparent and well-regulated system should be put in place. This would in turn inspire 'the confidence that would incline the state's creditors to lend funds on terms more favorable than in the subjective conscience of the contracting party, but they lack an enforceable obligation in case of non-fulfilment. The issue for the Abbé de Saint-Pierre was how to introduce the shift from a moral requirement to a legally binding framework. This challenge could only be met if politics were not determined by short-sighted calculations of self-interest that reached no further than a balance of power. This might represent a realistic response to the de facto situation of interstate relations, but failed to provide any structural stability beyond the contingent outcome of fickle alliances and the fortunes of war. Politics which skirted around the challenge of providing a framework in which mutual trust was feasible could not escape the shifting pattern of alliances and counter-alliance. Self-interest would thus perpetuate mistrust and fear among states, a regrettable situation that Saint-Pierre attributed to the balance of power: 'If the evidence reasoning provides is not sufficient, one should consult experience, so that one sees what has happened in the last two hundred years in the system of a balance of power. One may read the history of Europe. What has this unfortunate system achieved apart from almost constant wars? How little time did the truce of Vervins 243 last? I could not call with another name than truce this peace which was not able to last. However, since this truce, how long has the war lasted? Here is the effect of the balance so much desired by all. Is it not the role of the past to teach us that with a similar cause we can only expect a future with similar results? Who does not see that under the system of a balance of power one only enjoys security with weapons in one's hand? And therefore, we cannot enjoy our freedom at the expense of our respite'. 244 those which the state presently enjoyed'. Kaiser, "The Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Public Opinion, and the Reconstitution of the French Monarchy", p. 631. 243 The Treaty of Vervins was concluded on 13 April 1598 between Philip II and Henry IV -officially
France was again at war with Spain from 1635 onwards, but actually one could argue that Louis XIII's nomination of Richelieu as member of the Conseil in 1624 was also the moment France resumed the war against Spain. See Weber, "Vom verdeckten zum offenen Krieg", p. The Abbé de Saint-Pierre addressed two levels of argument throughout his Projet. He was keen to demonstrate that right reasoning would lead everybody to the same conclusions he drew himself. He presented his method as being in the tradition of Descartes and maintained that human reason was the critical judge of the validity of any intellectual undertaking. But, as he implies in the above citation, some people may not be used to abstract reasoning, or think it not sufficient proof in the realm of politics. When these people refer to experience, they too will be drawn to his conclusions. In recalling that the period between 1598 and 1713 was not one of peace and stability, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre is stressing the difference between a temporary truce and an enduring peace treaty. The latter is, of course, meant to end the hostilities for good. But it is the notion of a truce, not peace, that characterises a balance of power.
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The Abbé de Saint-Pierre denounced the balance of power as nothing more than an improvised system 246 which tried, in his view entirely in vain, to address the underlying structural contradictions of the anarchical society of sovereign states.
247 He was more sceptical about this system and its underlying principle of a balance of power than many of his contemporaries. What was necessary, according to the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, was the rule of law. Only this would provide stability and reliability, which would in turn make mutual trust possible. But the rule of law among states was, analogous to the state of nature, only possible if states gave up the unrestricted rights of their sovereignty.
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The problem was that 'the present constitution of Europe would never bring about anything other than almost permanent wars because it was unable to provide sufficient security for the execution of 245 As we saw in Chapter 4.1, Leibniz had made a very similar point before him. 246 Heinz Duchhardt stressed the importance of the notion of a state system. He perceived such a system as interwoven by cultural, economic and political links which were not intended to destroy other states but were meant to last and to provide a structural basis for the relations between states. Duchhardt, "Das Reich in der Mitte des Staatensystems", p. treaties'. 249 According to the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, this unstable situation had to be overcome in order to ensure that the conflicting parties were to have 'another rule than the will of the sovereign princes, that is to say the rule of law'.
250 In reference to Hobbes, the Abbé reiterated almost expressis verbis the Hobbesian description of the state of nature: 'I reflected upon the sad life of the savages. In truth they do not depend on any sovereign, any law or society; but because of the necessities of life they are extremely dependent on the seasons. They are even dependent on ferocious animals and what is most terrible about their dependence is that they also depend on their neighbours who are no different from the ferocious animals and who could at any time take their possessions and even their lives without punishment. ( . . . ) It is all very well that they make mutual promises in order to enjoy their possessions in peace, they have no security whatsoever that they will be kept. ( . . . ) Who would be so eccentric as to prefer the life of the savages, with its independence of all laws coupled with its hard and perpetual dependence of each on the other, to the life that we enjoy of perfect independence from others, coupled with our dependence on laws?'
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The state of nature scenario serves once more to evoke the consequences when no legal legitimate framework safeguards human society. Without the rule of law there will be no security which would allow states to trust in the keeping of promises and contracts.
Drawing the same conclusion as Hobbes reached for individuals in the state of nature, Saint-Pierre envisaged an arbiter endowed with sufficient power to enforce agreement between states, which would be in the interest of every state concerned, because it would not only overcome the fragilities of a balance of power but also enhance commerce and industry: 'They are not facilitated by arts or commerce, because they have no laws, nor a permanent society which can punish those who break the laws'. 252 Like in Hobbes's political society, the interstate order that Saint-Pierre envisaged is not an arbitrary social gathering of people, but the legal framework of a political body, established and thus legitimised by contract, and backed by an enforceable law. 253 As to an arbiter of this system of European states under the rule of law, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre envisaged a European Union or federation with representative institutions in the form of a permanent congress and a law court. The arbiter was, therefore, not conceptualised as a single person or individual sovereign.
Unlike a social contract between individuals, however, the envisaged contract for establishing a society between the European states had to be installed to be effective.
254 For the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, it was crucial to convince the European sovereigns to join together in such a contract.
Hence his endeavour to demonstrate that it was not only in the interest of each state, but that such a society was at the same time a practicable solution to the endemic conflicts between the states. Nevertheless: 'It is absolutely necessary that everyone remains in possession of what he currently enjoys'.
255 Saint-Pierre grasped that preservation of the liberty and independence of the different states was a precondition and the goal of the contract: 'It is absolutely necessary for the preservation of their lives, their goods, their freedoms and their rights, that they agree in their protestation that no one will claim to be judge of his own cause'. 256 Being judge in one's own case (ipse judex) was the distinguishing character of the state of nature. What remained was to define an institutional organisation to guarantee the security of a society based on law. 'It is absolutely necessary that they [the states] agree to provide sufficient means to give arbitration sufficient strength to execute the general laws and particular judgements. The sword is no less necessary for justice, than the scales, laws and judgements ( . . . ) which would be useless if arbitration had not the power to execute them. We have to make sure that no one could be tempted to resist the force of arbitration'. 257 The challenging task was, on the one hand, to establish an arbiter empowered with sufficient authority and adequate powers of coercion and, on the other hand, to ensure that such an arbiter would not misuse his coercive power and thus threaten the rights and liberty of the contracting states. A federative structure of states was the Abbé's answer to this challenge. A political body based on federative principles would allow for the establishment of a sufficiently strong arbiter but still respect the rights and liberties of the contracting parties.
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Initially, the Abbé chose the federative structure of the Swiss, Dutch and German states as an appropriate example for the European union of states: 'I found that if the ( . . . ) Sovereigns of Europe in order to preserve their role in the current government, to avoid war between them and to gain all the advantages of perpetual trade from nation to nation, wanted to conclude a treaty of union and a perpetual congress, more or less on the same model of the seven sovereignties of the Netherlands, or the thirteen sovereignties of Switzerland, or the sovereignties of Germany and to create the European Union based on what is good about these Unions, especially the Germanic Union which is composed of two hundred sovereignties ( . . . ) so that the weakest would have enough security, the most powerful would not be able to ruin the others, and everyone would keep their reciprocal promises exactly'. 259 We ought to pause here for a moment. The enumerated advantages of such a union with a coercive power for arbitration at its disposal are first and foremost the avoidance of war, followed by trade, enjoyment of the political privileges of the sovereign states, the security of even the smaller members of such a union and the trustworthiness of given promises. The notion of trust enjoys a status in this concept that is not to be overlooked. It is of equal importance with the other prima facie more tangible benefits and values listed.
The form a political body because the Empire operated a wide range of institutions. But a question remains. After giving a historical account of the Holy Roman Empire from the time of Charles the Great, and of the later competitive relationship between the estates and the emperor resulting in the eventual establishment of a federal structure, the Abbé de SaintPierre advances the claim that such a federation had been founded by commitment to a treaty and that such a treaty rested on the theoretical work of a 'wise author of the Germanic union' 262 who had sketched such a union as a project. 263 Why, one has to wonder, did the Abbé introduce this myth? 264 Especially since the Holy Roman Empire was intended to play a crucial role in the Abbé's argument for the practicability of such a foundational contract and its ensuing functioning political institutions for Europe. This whole idea of a founding contract for the federation of the Holy Roman Empire on the basis of a previous project becomes even more puzzling when the Abbé asserts: 'I do not know if this project was first the idea of a prince or of an individual. I do not know either who contributed to its creation, but still the Union was to be established. It was not created without a project and it was in that time that this political masterpiece appeared, worthy of a good prince or a good citizen, and which had been so necessary for the salvation of the country'.
265 Among many of the Abbé's critics was Leibniz, who criticised him exactly because of this conception. 'It seems', Leibniz argues, 'that he conceives the German union as having begun with some treaty; but this cannot be reconciled with history'.
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Though lacking the historical facts regarding the foundation of the Holy Roman Empire, the Abbé was nevertheless keen to demonstrate that its existing institutions could serve as a model for his envisaged union of European states. 267 He knew, however, that the institutional structure of the Holy Roman Empire was less than straightforward. Criticising the emperor for undermining the federative union of the Holy Roman Empire, the Abbé found the tension between the emperor and the estates to have jeopardised the project of a federative republic. 268 It was because of 'this old monarchical construction [that it was so difficult] to form all those states into one republican state like the Germanic one'. 269 Leibniz maintained the opposite view: 'The defect of the Empire is not, as M. l'Abbé de SaintPierre seems to take it, that the Emperor has too much power, but that the Emperor, as Emperor, does not have enough'. 270 But the Abbé de SaintPierre's commitment was to establish a federative union on republican principles that would overcome the structural problems of the anarchical and precarious society of European states.
In the Abbé's account of the Empire, the Diet and the imperial law chamber, the Reichskammergericht, mutually endorsed and incorporated the federative structure, these two institutions guaranteed the representation of all the members in the Diet and served as arbiter for disputes within the federation. Also crucial was the system of the imperial circles (Reichskreise) providing for an even distribution of power within the union. However, this republican structure was threatened by the emperor: 'The weakening of the freedom of the Germanic Union becomes even more evident if we consider the state in which the authority of the Imperial Chamber is currently found. ( . . . ) It was, so to speak, the centre of the Union ( . . . ). The authority of this Chamber combined with the authority of the Diet ( . . . ) made up all the strength of the Union, it was in the Emperor's interests to weaken them'.
271 The conflict of interests between the emperor and the estates was a commonplace topic of debate in the Holy Roman Empire and in France alike.
272 Bypassing the intractable question of where sovereignty could be found in the Holy Roman Empire, the Abbé's emphasis was on the original structure and foundation of the Holy Roman Empire, conceived as a republican federation that endured in the form of the imperial institutions. Regrettably the Emperor had usurped the sovereignty previously enshrined in the institutions: 'The Emperor became ( . . . ) the unique judge of the differences between the other sovereigns; therefore we can say that this single defect led irresistibly towards the ruin of the German Republic'.
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At least the notion of a founding project for the Holy Roman Empire allowed the Abbé a point of reference that transcended the imperfect actuality of the Holy Roman Empire. In this he was different from Rousseau, who admired the existing Holy Roman Empire as decisive in preserving the balance of power in Europe: 'Despite the negative aspects of the constitution of the Empire', Rousseau claims, 'it is certain that as long as it lasts, the balance of Europe will never be broken, no potentate will have to fear being dethroned by another, and the Treaty of Westphalia will have a good chance to remain the foundation of our political system'.
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Whereas Rousseau argued as a historian or politician referring to evident facts and their concrete implications, the Abbé's intention had been very different. 'Rousseau', as rightly argued by Sven Stelling-Michaud, 'has here deformed the thought of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre'. 275 The Abbé was much more daring than Rousseau gave him credit for. Rousseau warned that such a plan was 'too good to be adopted' and any attempt to realise it would demand 'violent means, which are unacceptable for humanity'.
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A republican constitution for the European sovereign states was the political aim. But since experience showed that on the interstate level one was ill-advised to trust entirely the goodwill of sovereigns, the Abbé recognised that to realise his project for perpetual peace might call for a virtuous lawgiver, if one could be found. In the third volume of his project he observed that the essence of his programme had 'previously been proposed by Henry the Great, king of France'. 277 It is telling that the Abbé changed the title of his project after Louis XIV's death on 1 September 1715. 278 In the first two volumes of the Projet published in 1713, the Abbé addressed only the reader in his preface and avoided reference to Louis XIV, but after Louis's death he addressed the regent, Philippe d'Orléans (1674-1723), in the third volume. 279 It is clear why he avoided addressing Louis XIV directly. As we have seen earlier, when considering the criticism Fénelon mounted against Louis XIV, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre was not the only French intellectual disappointed by the way his king used his power. But now, with the death of Louis XIV, the Abbé believed that the regent and perhaps future king, Louis XV, might make better use of his proposals. 280 The reference to Henry IV appeared in the address: 'To the regent, Sir, after having given in the third volume the remaining explanations which seemed necessary to demonstrate the importance and solidity of the famous project of Henry the Great, your ancestor; I thought that I should not dispense with offering your royal highness the entire work'. 281 A single sovereign 282 , it seems, might have the power to help realise a republican project of a European union. At issue for French foreign policy was a stable constitutional framework which would allow for peace and in turn foster free trade and the economic advantages flowing from it.
The Abbé de Saint-Pierre merits recognition as a political thinker who questioned certain consequences of the formation of the modern state at a time when this process was at its height. Though not the only writing which accompanied the negotiations at Utrecht 283 , the Abbé's Projet represents a thorough analysis of the interstate system. Contemporary concern was raised regarding the trustworthiness of Louis XIV and thus the reliability of the Utrecht peace settlement. Christoph Ziegler suggested in the subtitle of his Umständliches Friedens-Diarium that French negotiations for peace were conducted with fraudulent intent.
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The treaties concluded at Utrecht expressly based the European state system and assurance of peace on the idea of a balance of power 285 : 'But whereas the war which is so happily ended by this peace, was at the beginning undertaken, and was carried on for so many years with the utmost force, at immense charge, and with almost infinite slaughter, because of the great danger which threatened the liberty and safety of all Europe, from the too close conjunction of the kingdoms of Spain and France. And whereas to take away all uneasiness and suspicion, concerning such conjunction, out of the minds of people, and to settle and establish the peace and tranquility of Christendom by an equal balance of power (which is the best and most solid foundation of a mutual friendship, and of a concord which will be lasting on all sides) as well the Catholic King as the Most Christian King have consented, that care should be taken by sufficient precautions, that the kingdoms of Spain and France should never come and be united under the same dominion'. 286 That the European powers remained suspicious of each other is confirmed by the idea that a balance of power would be the best and most solid foundation of a mutual friendship. Mistrust and lack of institutional mechanisms to mediate conflicts remained intrinsic to this system. The Abbé's alternative programme addressed the issue of trust as well as the shortcomings of the balance of power. In his Annales politiques, published shortly after his death, he summarised again in five 'fundamental articles for a European Diet' 287 the stipulations to which all European sovereigns needed to subscribe. Only by establishing a permanent federative representation of all European states, endowed with power of arbitration to resolve any ensuing conflicts, would enduring security for all states be possible. 288 This remained the essential alternative to the anarchical society of independent sovereign states and their unstable balance of power. A reoccurring objection to the idea of a federative association as an effective institutionalised framework guaranteeing peace was that it impinged on the prerogatives of (princely) state sovereignty, 'a Thing' as William Penn put it in his Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe 'they will never endure'. 289 But as Penn and others like Crucé or the Abbé de SaintPierre, who advanced some such framework were eager to demonstrate, this objection was 'a Mistake, for they [the sovereign states] remain as Soveraign at Home as ever they were. Neither their Power over their People, nor the usual revenue they pay them, is diminished ( . . . ). So that the Soveraignties are as they were, for none of them have now any Soveraignty over one another: And if this be called a lessening of their Power, it must be only because the great Fish can no longer eat up the little ones 290 , and that each Soveraignty is equally defended from Injuries, and disabled from committing them'.
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The concept of trust had emerged in the international political thought of the seventeenth century as a key component in alternative conceptualisations of interstate relations. But on its own it remained too feeble to ground and enforce an interstate order of peace. According to the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, trust needed to be re-enforced by legitimate power. This was only possible on the basis of a delegation of sovereignty on the international level in the form of a republican federation of the sovereign states.
